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Abstract
In the European countries - particularly among the members of the European Economic and
Monetary Union - a satisfactory degree of nominal convergence has been achieved. As to real
trends, the convergence process has not been completed and, in some cases, not even started;
the structural characteristics of labour markets, as well as their macroeconomic performance,
are one significant example. The aim of this paper is to compare the long-run evolutions of
employment and unemployment in the European regions. I made use of different databases
(Eurostat's Regio, Oecd, Crenos), for the last two (and in some cases four) decades, and
considered the five biggest countries: (West) Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy,
Spain; the number of regions included is about 80.
The first result of my empirical research confirms that - in several European countries - the
unemployment rates have been high and increasing over time, while the employment rates have
been slowly decreasing. A second result is that the dispersion (of a s-type)  in regional
employment and unemployment varies in intensity from country to country, but it has been
growing almost everywhere and it seems positively related to the mean (national) values; on
the other hand, a convergence (of the b-type) has been found only in certain periods and
considering specific subsets of countries. Finally, it seems that the average employment growth
is negatively related to the cross-regional dispersion (in employment growth rates) and
positively associated with the corresponding cross–country dispersion.
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1.  Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to examine the long-run behaviour of employment in the
European regions. In the recently born European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), two
main problems are still waiting for an answer:
• once a satisfactory degree of nominal convergence has been achieved, how can we deal
effectively with the problems of real convergence, and particularly with the huge
unemployment and the other labour market problems, which characterise – on average –
EMU’s countries?
• will national and regional differences increase or decrease in the EMU context?
As we shall see in the next section, the two questions are strictly linked. I can anticipate
that it is the presence of frictions or obstacles to the adjustment process, especially after
asymmetric shocks and particularly in the labour markets, which can make persistent the
disparities between regions and nations of the EMU’s area. This type of theoretical
considerations is discussed in Section 2.
A survey of previous empirical works on regional disparities in Europe is then
presented in Section 3, by concentrating on the most recent literature about the empirical tests
of the “optimum currency area” hypothesis, the differentiated answers to different types of
shocks and the comparisons between the European situation and the US’s case.
In the past, regional disparities in Europe have been studied by focusing on per-capita
income, production or productivity. Thus, my original contribution is to analyse regional
differentiation in terms of employment dynamics. In Section 4, I present a descriptive analysis
on employment rates (total employment divided by working-age population) and employment
growth rates, highlighting the asymmetries existing between the European regions and the
(limited) convergence resulting from the data. I made used of Eurostat's Regio data set, for the
period 1979-97, by limiting (at this stage) to the five biggest countries: (West) Germany,
France, United Kingdom, Italy, Spain.
In Section 5, by making use of a different data set, prepared by OECD, I consider a
longer period (1960-1996), at least for some countries. In this case, I have examined also the
comparative behaviour of regional unemployment rates in the long run.
In section 6, from a descriptive analysis I try to move to a tentative explanation of the
observed trends, by making use of a still different database (from Crenos). The countries are
once more the five biggest European countries and the period is 1977-91. I have used different
econometric methods, and particularly some panel-data regressions, in order to capture the
heterogeneous behaviour of the European regions and the differentiated impact of various
types of shocks: structural or aggregate shocks. The original result is the differentiated impact
coming from the (inter)regional dispersion in employment growth rates compared to the
(inter)national one.
Some conclusions, including some implications for European or national economic
policies, are drawn in Section 7.
2. Regional disparities, labour market performance and the EMU
A huge unemployment still persists in many European countries, particularly the most
central ones, and is probably the biggest problem that policymakers have still to solve as well3
as a serious challenge to EMU. As a matter of fact, the existence of wide variations in labour
market performances and, more specifically, in unemployment rates may undermine the success
of EMU, which in turn may perpetuate, at least for a transitional period, such disparities. In the
new policy regime, a shock may hurt some specific economies and cause a substantial damage,
because of the absence of appropriate economic policy instruments (Eichengreen, 1993). In
particular, within the new EMU's policy regime (Buti and Sapir, 1998), mention should be
made for the lack or deficiency of:
• monetary and exchange-rate policies at the national level,
• fiscal policies,  both at the national level - because of the restrictions implied by the Pact
for Stability and Growth (as well as by the transition to fiscal harmonisation) and at the
community one: in the latter case, it has been noted the deficit of a centralised (or at least
centrally-coordinated) European fiscal policy or of a system of automatic fiscal transfers
from the EU budget (also because its size is quite limited).
No matter if the shock is demand-side or supply-side, symmetric or asymmetric, there
may be different responses in the divers countries (or regions), with more or less pronounced
real effects. In the case of asymmetric shocks, production and employment may rise in certain
economic systems and fall in some other economies. But even symmetric shocks may lead to
differentiated responses, at least in terms of the intensity of the effects, due to the different
economic structures.
The real effects comprise all the traditional effects on real variables: production, real
income, employment and unemployment. However, in this research I am particularly interested
in labour market evolutions. The theoretical reason is that most of the literature on monetary
unions and optimum currency areas has drawn attention to the flexibility of wages and to the
mobility of workers as possible adjustment mechanisms after a shock. But also on the empirical
side, with more than 16 million people unemployed, the employment problem is still to be
considered the absolute priority in the EU.
1
It is possible that the heterogeneous responses of the economic systems will be felt also
at the national level, with some countries gaining and some others losing from shocks arriving
in the monetary union. However, it is much more likely that divergent responses will be
experienced by regions, particularly in view of the more marked specialisation of the economic
systems at the regional level.
When we talk of employment dynamics
2, we should consider both short-run cyclical
evolutions and in long-run dynamics. In the latter case, in order to explain the natural (or
structural) rate of unemployment, the structural characteristics of the economic systems are of
primary importance, as it is shown by the neoclassical growth models or the endogenous
growth models
3, on one side, and by the development theories, on the other side.
4
                                               
1 See the surveys by Bean (1994), Nickell and Layard (1998).
2 In recent growth models, employment is connected to economic growth through different links (some of
them are discussed in Nickell and Layard, 1998). It is just worth to mention that, in some models, high rates of
growth are associated with high unemployment: for example, in the model of Aghion and Howitt (1994), a
greater rate of growth leads to more innovation, wider labour reallocations and, at the end, higher
unemployment.
3 The relevant structural parameters are, respectively, the rate of population growth, the saving rate, the
depreciation of physical capital, and the rate of technical progress for the first class of models; the degree of
returns to scale, the rate of investment in human capital, the degree of technological diffusion, and the type of
linkages between sectors, according to the second type of models.4
In the case of short run cyclical evolutions of employment and unemployment, I should
mention, on the contrary, the role of aggregate demand shocks or also of supply-side shocks,
such as asymmetric shocks that imply a shift in the labour allocation (e.g. between sectors or
across regions). Aggregate demand shocks include, of course, the effects of standard
macroeconomic policies. Also in this case, however, the structure of the economy is important,
whatever the initial shock, in order to uncover the transmission (or propagation) mechanism of
the disturbance and to understand the effects on the real economy. Of course, the final real
effects will depend both on the behaviour of economic agents, given the economic structure
(market response), and on the possible implementation of counteracting macroeconomic
policies (policy response).
Asymmetric shocks, which for instance modify the sectoral structure of production
(because of technical progress, change in tastes or modifications in the international division of
labour), have been particularly studied. Two types of economic effects can be identified:
1. in terms of distributive issues, the “allocative” shocks imply that production and
employment may increase, at least temporarily, in some sectors or regions and decrease in
some other industries or territorial areas: this is the argument against currency areas to be
built between heterogeneous countries;
2. moreover, even if we focus on aggregate (national or European) trends, the existence of
rigidities in the labour market and of frictions in the adjustment mechanisms (including the
degree of labour mobility) will cause a slow growth of employment also in the expanding
sectors, thus aggregate employment will temporarily slow down: this was the famous
Lilien’s theory of sectoral shifts (1982), that was also empirically tested.
5
An example of an asymmetric shock is provided by a sector-specific shock. This shock,
in turn, may become country-specific - or, even more presumably, region-specific (given the
higher degree of openness and greater specialisation of regions) - because of the concentration
of production and the operation of regional specialisation effects. We also know that regional
scientists have traditionally emphasised the role of the external (localisation and agglomeration)
economies; increasing returns to scale are one of the distinguishing features of the "new
growth theory" and the "new trade theory. From this point of view, sustained by Krugman
(1991), economic integration is likely to lead to increased specialisation, diverging economic
structures, and contrasting growth rates: this will be the conceivable effect of EMU.
6
Recent empirical work has been devoted, by many scholars, to assess the relative
importance of symmetric vs. asymmetric shocks. In any case, according to what we have said
before, the distinction symmetric vs. asymmetric is even less critical, if there are substantial
differences in the economic structure (see Marelli, 1997). As a matter of fact, the same
                                                                                                                                                  
4 Here, the relevant structural conditions are the sectoral mix of production and the labour force
participation rate, together with many other characteristics: firms size, extension of the underground or
informal economy, dualistic aspects of product and labour markets, immigration rates, levels of education,
changes in the international division of labour, government policies, etc. (with the addition, in some studies, of
extra-economic elements: social, cultural, religious, political).
5 Lilien found that the unemployment rate was (in the US case) positively correlated over time with a
sectoral dispersion index (sigma), computed as follows: si  =  [Si Nit/Nt (Dln Nit -Dln Nt)2]½ where:  i
identifies an individual sector, N  is employment, D   is the first difference operator and ln  stands for logarithm.
6 “The penalty is that regional economies, being less diversified, are more subject to technology and
demand shocks. This leads to a greater risk of severe region-specific recessions. It also leads, in the presence
of high factor mobility, to large divergences in long-term growth rates”  (Krugman, 1993,  p. 247).5
aggregate shock (due for instance to the international business cycle or to a common
technological innovation) may produce divergent effects in different regions (or countries), in
view of diversities in sectoral specialisations, nominal rigidities, labour mobility, structural
policies and heterogeneous institutions; i.e., the divergent real effects may arise from the
different propagation mechanisms or from an asymmetric regional response to an aggregate
shock.
After having shown that even an aggregate (or symmetric) shock may bring about,
given divergent economic structures
7, heterogeneous effects in the different sectors or in the
divers regions (or countries), one might ask: what is, more precisely, the meaning of economic
structure? We can simply start from the theory of the optimum currency areas
8 which
identifies the following elements, including the alternative adjustment mechanisms:
• the nominal flexibility of the system (in terms of prices and wages);
• the international (and interregional) mobility of resources: capital (real or financial
investments) and especially labour;
• the degree of openness of the economies and the sectoral composition of production
(together with the diversification or concentration of industries);
• the institutional organisation of markets, especially of the labour market
9;
• the fiscal structure (including the system of fiscal transfers), along with the implementation
of industrial, regional, educational, and other structural policies.
In the EMU, in the absence of the traditional tools of economic policy (exchange-rate,
monetary, and also fiscal), some reforms of product, labour and capital markets - perhaps
together with an appropriate system of fiscal transfers - may be the only way to bend the
economic structure in a way to minimise the negative effects of shocks and to avoid, in some
countries and regions, a further rise in unemployment rates. Only in this case, can we speak of
real convergence, in contrast with (or as a complement of) the concept of nominal
convergence characterising the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability Pact.
In the long run, the real convergence implies the narrowing of the differences in the
structural conditions of different countries, thus allowing the achievement of similar steady
states in the process of growth (as maintained by the conditional convergence hypothesis in
the economic growth literature). In the short run, the real convergence - that is reflected in
similar reactions of real variables (production, employment, etc.) to economic shocks -
facilitates the macroeconomic adjustment after (symmetric or asymmetric) shocks. If real
convergence is missing and economic structures are divergent, the obvious consequence is that
also the policy responses should be differentiated, by country or by region.
                                               
7 A recent empirical research on how macroeconomic shocks may be magnified by “imperfect” economic
structures has been carried out by Blanchard and Wolfers (1999), with reference to 20 countries of the OECD
area over four decades (starting from 1960).
8 The seminal work was by Mundell (1961), but it was Kenen (1969) who stressed the degree of industry or
product diversification as a determinant of the symmetry of shocks; of course, a given industrial structure may
make a certain area more vulnerable to asymmetric shocks. As to the more recent refinements, see Tavlas
(1993).
9 This includes the system of industrial relations, the degree of corporativism and the centralisation in the
process of wage setting, as well as the existing legislation concerning minimum wages and unemployment
benefits.6
3. Previous evidence on regional disparities and labour market problems in Europe
Among the various disaggregations of the economic structure, the regional one can be
considered particularly notable.
10 Also recent studies have shown that the unemployment
problem has a relevant regional dimension. In many European countries, the dispersion in
regional unemployment rates appears to be persistent (besides being correlated to the presence
of long run productivity differentials).
In Europe, interregional disparities are much deeper than international ones. In the
EU, the wealthiest region has an income per capita about 6 times higher than the poorest one,
while the gap between the most developed and the least advanced country is only 2 or 3
times.
11  Over time, it seems that interregional disparities in per capita incomes have decreased
from the ‘50s to the ‘70s, while the pattern has become less clear in the ‘80s (Sala-i-Martin,
1996).
More precisely, the convergence process in the ‘60s and early ‘70s (up to 1973) was
stronger in the regions of the European Community (than in other European regions): here,
convergence is of course to be meant as b-convergence and refers to all European regions
(Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995). On the other hand, within- countries convergence - although
present almost everywhere in this period - has been generally smaller in the Southern European
regions. Moreover, also in the EU's convergence period (the '60s and '70s), the rate of
convergence was not particularly high (2 per cent per year)
12, a speed unsatisfactory for many
European regions, if one important objective of the EU is economic cohesion. In some other
empirical studies, the speed of convergence has been estimated at lower levels; for example, at
1 per cent per annum for the period 1970-90, by Armstrong (1995).
According to many researchers (see, for example, Tondl, 1997; Canova and Marcet,
1995), at the end of the ‘70s, the speed of convergence decelerated in the Community’s
regions and, in the ‘80s, regional convergence either disappeared or was substituted by club
convergence (Fagerberg and Verspagen, 1996). From a spatial perspective, the southern
regions of Europe have converged in the early '80s, while the north of Europe has shown a
better performance in the second part of the '80s (Neven and Gouyette, 1995). Disaggregating
in terms of "economic centrality", it has laso been discovered (Rombaldoni, 1998) that in the
period 1981-94 the highest speed of convergence (about 10 per cent) has been experienced by
the "intermediate" and "inner peripheral" EU regions, while a lower speed of convergence (3
per cent) has been exhibited by the two extreme group of regions, the "central" and the "outer
peripheral" ones (the latter, however, have been recovering since 1988, probably because of
the increased EU's spending on structural funds after 1988). In some researches (Paci, 1996),
convergence between European regions has been found in the ‘80s too, but only in terms of
productivity levels (still at a reduced pace also in this case), rather than on the basis of per
capita incomes.
Nowadays, the process of economic and monetary integration itself, although
presumably promoting a faster pace of growth for Europe as a whole in the long run, may
produce uneven spatial effects and, at least temporarily, increase the existing disparities
                                               
10 For this section, I have extended my previous research (Marelli, 1997, 1998).
11 See also Paci (1997).
12 A similar value for the rate of convergence was obtained by Barro and Sala-i-Martin, in many researches
carried out in the early ‘90s, for both the US states and the EU regions (Sala-i-Martin, 1996). The first
important empirical work in the case of the US was the one by Blanchard and Katz (1992).7
(Abraham and Van Rompuy, 1995). The risk is that, due to the inadequacy of appropriate
compensating measures, the process of economic and monetary integration may conflict with
the EU’s goal of economic and social cohesion, especially in the presence of substantial
structural differences between the European regions (as I have stressed in the previous
section).
The structural characteristics of European regions have been investigated by many
researchers, sometimes by contrasting the European situation with the US one. This
comparison, which is different from the confrontation between the two areas in terms of their
capacity to create new jobs (the latter is the object of the studies on the eurosclerosis, the
flexibility of the labour markets, the tax burden, etc.)
13, is made in order to infer some
conclusions about the EMU project. They have examined, in particular, the degree of
similarity
14 and the speed of adjustment after shocks.
Some researches, by analysing the output correlations of EU countries with the leading
country (Germany), have not only confirmed the generally lower correlations compared with
the US case, but have also identified a core (comprising Germany, France, Benelux, Denmark)
in Europe, a result apparently congruous with the arguments advanced some years ago for a
“two-speed monetary union”. I must however add that, according to recent empirical evidence,
the most dynamic European countries seem to be, on the contrary, the peripheral ones (e.g.,
Ireland, Spain, Portugal).
Moreover, also in the past, some studies devoted to the European Monetary System’s
experience (see, for example, Artis and Zhang, 1999) have found that the business cycles of the
EMS countries have become more synchronised, probably because of increased international
trade, openness of financial markets and growing capital flows. EMU, from this point of view,
will probably lead to a further synchronisation, thus contrasting - to some extent - the negative
effects stressed by Krugman (mentioned in the previous section) caused by an increasing
degree of specialisation.
In some other researches, the low mobility of European workers has been analysed;
emphasis has been placed on the cultural, linguistic and normative obstacles that prevent a free
movement of people and workers across countries (although a low mobility also within
countries characterises most of European labour markets). In any case, labour mobility’s
response to unemployment is not significant in Europe - differently from the US - and so
cannot be considered a reliable adjustment mechanism after asymmetric shocks (Bayoumi and
Eichengreen, 1993; Bentivogli and Pagano, 1998); it should be added that labour mobility is, at
any rate, an efficient adjustment mechanism only when permanent shocks occur.
 According to recent OECD data (presented in Nickell and Layard, 1998) the
percentage of population changing region each year ranges, in the period 1980-87, from
minimum values of 0.4 in Spain and 0.6 in Italy to high values of 2.9 in the US and 3.7 in
Sweden. Some studies have also suggested that it is likely that international labour mobility
across EU countries will remain weak, even in the EMU framework, at least for many years to
come.
                                               
13 The impact of different types of “rigidities” in the European labour markets (in comparison with the US
case) upon the unemployment levels and trends has been recently discussed by Nickell (1997).
14 Decressin and Fatàs (1995) found that, on average, about 20 per cent (50 per cent if national dummy
variables are included) of the annual changes in employment of the EU regions is explained by European
employment growth, while in the US the common component accounts for 60 per cent of the variance.8
The investigation of the structural characteristics  has been related, in many researches,
to the typology of the shocks: symmetric or asymmetric, persistent or transitory, regional
national or global. In some explorations (Fatàs, 1997), it has been shown that both regional
and EU-wide shocks may be more important than national shocks.
Furthermore, it seems that  region-specific shocks are more important and less
symmetric in Europe than in the US (Decressin and Fatàs, 1995).
15 It is true that, both in
Europe and in the US, there seems to be - after a region-specific shock - a small adjustment of
wages and a rise in unemployment, but the lower degree of interregional labour mobility in
Europe risks to induce permanent effects on the unemployment rates (Abraham, 1996; Heylen
et al., 1995). If the latter effects are, in reality, not much more persistent, it is thanks to a
different adjustment mechanism: the change in labour force participation rates (migration
appears to play a certain role only in the medium run). Hence, regional employment levels
permanently change everywhere after a shock, but following a variation of regional populations
in the US and of employment rates in Europe (or, in some regions, through a change in the
extension of the hidden economy).
4. Employment dynamics in the European regions (1979-97, Regio database)
In this section, I carry out a descriptive analysis of employment dynamics in the
European regions, by using the Regio data set of Eurostat. I have selected five countries
(Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, Spain) and 78 regions, corresponding to NUTS-
1 level regions in the case of Germany
16 and the UK, and to NUTS-2 level regions for Italy,
France and Spain (the full list of regions is in Table 1). The period under investigation is 1979-
97.
As a measure of labour market performance, I prefer to start with an international
comparison of employment rates and employment growth rates, which should capture
employment dynamics  both in the short run (cyclical variations) and in the long run
(permanent trends), rather than focusing on the more commonly used “unemployment rates”
(as a matter of fact, the latter are strictly dependent on the various definitions and institutional
settings, which change markedly from country to country and also over time).
From the long-run perspective, employment rates reflect not only the capacity of the
system to provide an occupation to human resources (willing to work), i.e. a measure of the
macroeconomic performance, but also the level of social and cultural development (I could just
mention the issue of women participation to work). It would be interesting to compare the
evolutions of employment rates, both between countries and also across the regions of the
same country. Since it is well-known that the initial situation was much differentiated between
and within countries, a second question is whether there has been, over time, a convergence
process?
Fig. 1 gives a first answer in the case of four countries.
17 For all years from 1979 to
1997, the UK and Germany had employment rates above the European average, which is close
                                               
15Also a recent study by Bayoumi and Prasad (1997) has shown that industry- and region-specific shocks
are more important than common shocks in the explanation of disaggregated output growth in Italy.
16 Because of the limited number of observations, Eastern länders have been excluded.
17 In this case, Spain has been excluded because some data of the Regio data set are available only since
1986.9
to 50 per cent: by about 5 percentage points in the case of the UK and by 2-3 percentages
points for Germany; France's rates have been almost perfectly equivalent to the European
average, while Italy was below it (by more than 5 points).
The European average has been somehow decreasing in the two decades, reflecting
both the French and the German evolutions (in the latter case limited to the ‘90s), but
especially the Italian one: employment rates in Italy have been more or less steady in the ‘80s
and significantly falling in the ‘90s. Only in the U.K. are the employment rates greater now
than two decades ago, although we can uncover (from Fig. 1.D) two inverted-U cycles (the
highest values have been reached in the final years of each decade).
The national averages conceal, however, a significant intra-national variation across
regions. In addition to the well-known low values, which characterise many Mediterranean
regions of Italy and Spain, it is apparent the great interregional dispersion within many other
countries: not only Italy and Spain, but also France and Germany. It is also commonly
accepted that employment rates have decreased in many countries, in the last two decades, in
the male component, while increasing in the female one. Moreover, the low values for the
employment rates in some countries and regions may be related to the extension of the black
economy or the informal sector.
As a first approximation to a dispersion measure, Fig. 1 also shows the min. and max.
regional values of employment rates for each country. The lowest dispersion can be found in
the United Kingdom and the highest one in Italy: this phenomenon is not new at all, since it
reflects the famous dualistic aspects of the Italian economy. Probably less known is the recent
widening of interregional variations of employment rates in Italy. While the highest regional
value is around (or even above) the European average – and this is true in general for regions
located in Northern Italy – the lowest values (corresponding to Southern regions) have reached
some record low values between 30 and 35 per cent.
A more complete dispersion measure, following the so-called s-convergence approach
of the economic-growth literature, it is the standard deviation (s.d.) of regional employment
rates; it is shown, for the same countries (including Spain from 1986) and for the aggregates
(EU4 and EU5), in Fig. 3. Again, aside from the U.K., and to a lesser extent Germany, the
interregional dispersions have increased everywhere: the highest increase has been recorded in
Italy.
As to the employment growth rates (Fig. 2), they have been much more stable over
time in France and Germany (except in the latter country the period around 1990-92) than in
Italy or the U.K.: the latter country exhibits not only growth rates greater than in the other
countries, but the largest cyclical variations. The min.-max. range is wide not only in Italy, but
also in France and (in some years) in Germany.
By examining now the 78 regions
18 altogether, employment growth in the second
(1986-97) sub-period does not seem related to employment growth in the first (1979-86) sub-
period (see the scatter diagram in Fig. 4.A). On the contrary, the final (1997) employment rate
is positively associated with the initial (1979) employment rate (Fig. 4.B), denoting persistence
(the correlation coefficient, R, is equal to 0.823).
The picture, drawn so far, is one of persisting interregional and international
differentiation, with a substantial lack of convergence. I can now add, however, a different
analysis, along the lines of the b-convergence approach: the aim is not to derive precise
                                               
18 The regions are 60 when Spain is excluded.10
quantitative estimates of the relevant parameters (e.g. the speed of convergence), but rather to
show how such an approach can be extended to variables (like employment growth) different
from income or productivity, as well as to stress how the results can change, according to the
period and to the subset of countries which is chosen.
If we consider the full period 1979-97, Fig. 5.A shows a positive relationship between
employment growth and the initial employment rate (in 1979), thus indicating a small
divergence (R is equal to 0.268). Even if we take a different explanatory variable (Fig. 5.B),
such as the initial per-capita gross domestic product (in 1980)
19, a moderate positive
relationship seems to occur (R=0.169): the initially rich regions have been able to raise more,
in the last two decades, their employment.
By limiting now my analysis to the first sub-period (1979-86), when Spain is excluded
from the analysis Fig. 5.C and Fig. 5.D show that the previous positive relationships become
negative (with R=-0.255 and R=-0.104 respectively for the two explanatory variables): for this
sub-period, a limited convergence seems to emerge from the data. It is the strong positive
relationship obtained for the subsequent sub-period (1986-97), both in terms of initial
employment rates (Fig. 6.B) and  per-capita GDP (Fig. 6.D), pointing at a strong divergence
(R=0.494 and R=0.331 respectively), which contributes to produce the (above mentioned)
results for the full period.
But, again, if for the recent sub-period (1986-97) I include also the Spanish regions, the
previous divergence is converted into a (quite limited) convergence in the case of employment
rates (Fig. 6.A) or a lack of any association in the case of per-capita GDP (Fig. 6.C). This
shows how the results are sensitive to the subset of countries included and to the period of
investigation!
5. Regional unemployment in a long run perspective (1960-96, OECD database)
A more extended sample, as to the time interval (which for some countries goes back
to 1960) and also the number of regions (which are now 81), is provided by the OECD
database.
20 Of course, the results in terms of employment growth cannot be significantly
different from the ones of the previous section. Hence, I have decided to focus in this section
on the (more familiar) unemployment rates. I have analysed again the five countries of Section
4, but because of space limitations, I consider here some diagrams relative to three countries.
Fig. 7 presents, first of all, the average national unemployment rates for the three
countries: Germany (7.A), the United Kingdom (7.B), and Italy (7.C); the period is 1965-96
for the U.K. and 1960-96 for the two remaining countries. In addition to the mean
unemployment rates, also the data corresponding to the 1
st and 3
rd quartiles of the regional
distribution (in each single country) are reported. Finally, the interregional standard deviations
(s.d.) are also shown (on the right scale of the diagrams).
We can see that the mean rates have increased in all three countries from the mid-70’s
to the mid-‘80s, then they decreased in the U.K. (especially at the end of the ‘80s), stayed
                                               
19 The first year for which Regio’s data were available; per capita GDP is measured in purchasing power
parities.
20 See OECD, "Time-Series Statistics of Employment and Unemployment for Regions Within OECD
Countries", 1990. The original data set ended in 1989 (see Epifani, 1999); I thank P. Epifani for having
extended it (with the help of national statistics) to 1996 and given the data to me.11
more or less unchanged in Germany (with a momentary fall around 1990-92), while increased a
bit more in Italy.
The distance from 1
st and 3
rd quartiles is most evident in Italy (and is increasing over
time), it was large in the U.K. around the mid-‘80s (while in the most recent years is almost
nil), and in Germany becomes appreciable only in the last ten years (even excluding the Eastern
länders). The lowest values of the (interregional) s.d. can be found in the U.K. (decreasing
since 1986) and the highest ones (now five times the British values) in Italy. In Germany, they
were in the past extremely low, but at the end of the ‘80s they surpassed the British values.
The most important and interesting fact to notice is the positive association between the
means and the s.d.’s: when national unemployment rates increase, also the dispersion across
the regional unemployment rates rises. This is true in all countries, even in France and Spain
(here not considered).
In order to assess the evolutions in each single region of the three countries, Fig. 8
depicts the average unemployment rates in three sub-periods
21:
1. from the ‘60s to the mid-‘70s  (the exact intervals for the three countries are the following:
1960-72 Germany, 1965-76 the U.K., 1960-76 Italy),
2. from the mid ‘70s to the mid-‘80s  (1973-85, 1976-86, 1977-86 for the three countries),
3. from the mid ‘80s to the mid-‘90s (1986-96, 1987-96, 1986-96 respectively).
We can observe that the increase over time of the unemployment rates in Germany has
not been homogeneous, but it has affected certain regions (like the Berlin area) more than
others. The U.K. is the only country (out of five, of the full sample) where the unemployment
rates in almost all regions have decreased from the 2
nd to the 3
rd period; however, even there
certain regional differences can be detected.
The case of Italy is the most astonishing. The rise of unemployment has been continous
from period to period in the Mezzogiorno’s regions (the ones represented in the north-eastern
side of the diagram). On the contrary, in all regions of Northern Italy and in many regions of
Central Italy, the increase in unemployment can hardly be noticed. The asymmetrical behaviour
of unemployment in the Italian regions is the clearest evidence of divergence in regional labour
market performances.
As a way of conclusion, in order to stress once more the previously commented
relationship between the mean unemployment rates and their interregional dispersion, I present
Fig. 9, which includes all five countries for the three periods (two in the case of France and
Spain).
22 The absolutely high and robust (over time and across countries) correlation between
the two variables need no further comment.
23
6. A tentative explanation: structural shocks and labour reallocation at the regional
and national levels (1977-91, Crenos database)
                                               
21 The break coincides with some discontinuities (different from country to country) in the original data.
22 The original data, and hence the 2
nd sub-period of my classification, start around the mid-‘70s.
23 The correlation coefficient between the mean values (for each country and period included in Fig. 9) and
their corresponding dispersion measures is equal to 0.785. Epifani (1999) obtains a similarly high correlation
between national values and interregional s.d.; his theoretical model, based on "new trade" theories, shows that
European unemployment may be generated by the interaction of globalisation, increased specialisation and
labour market imperfections.12
I illustrate in this section a new analysis on employment growth in the EU regions, by
focusing once more on the five biggest countries of the EU and by considering 81 regions
(more or less coincident with the previous ones), in the last two decades. I make use of a
different data set, the one provided by Crenos
24 and I try to derive some tentative explanations
by means of econometric methods.
25
I have used time-series, cross- section, and panel-data regressions, in order to capture
the heterogeneous behaviour of European regions and the differentiated impact of various
types of shocks: structural or aggregate shocks.
As to time-series analysis, a first important result is that there seems to be a counter-
cyclical behaviour of the interregional dispersion index (SREU, as computed for all regions of
the five countries with the formula in footnote [6], but the same applies to other types of
dispersion indices); moreover, an inverse relationship between such dispersion index and the
average (national) employment growth rates seems to hold. Perhaps, besides Lilien’s effect, an
asymmetry of the following type is working: while in the high-growth periods employment
expansion is more homogenous between regions, in downturns employment decline affects
some regions more profoundly than others.
26
To give a more complete explanation of Lilien's hypothesis, extended to the regional
case, suppose that a shock hits positively the labour market in some specific regions and
negatively in some other regions (e.g. because of a change in the structure of
consumption/production or in the international division of labour): this is reflected in an
increase in the SREU index. Because of the short-run rigidities and frictions, including the
scarce mobility of the labour force, even the favoured regions cannot fully exploit the effects of
the asymmetric shock: hence, aggregate employment growth will be adversely affected.
A different type of explanation of labour reallocations, more microeconomic oriented,
is provided by the studies of Davis, Haltiwanger and other researchers (see, for example,
Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh, 1996). As the authors recognise, important job reallocation
activities characterise not only the "flexible and fluid" US labour market, but many other
economies as well, including many European countries (see also Contini et al., 1995). The
main empirical result – in the US case - is that, during recessions, only a small part of the jump
in job destructions can be attributed to cyclical fluctuations in demand and supply of labour; a
great part of their change is instead due to labour reallocations between sectors, activities, and
production units. Some other empirical results of this sort of research are the following:
• reallocation within sectors is equally important as that between sectors;
• firms prefer to make large and infrequent reductions of their labour forces (probably
because of nonlinear adjustment practices);
• the restructuring operations are concentrated in the first period after the shock;
                                               
24 Centro Ricerche Economiche Nord Sud, Università degli Studi di Cagliari (see Paci, 1997). Differently
from Regio’s data bank, Crenos classification includes regions with an acceptable degree of economic
homogeneity and also some sort of administrative and policy power; moreover it represents more evenly the
Northern and Southern European regions.
25 This description is taken from Marelli (1998).
26 This may also be related to an asymmetric behaviour of wages, that are downward sticky (because of
unions or minimum wages) for negative shocks and upward flexible for positive shocks. For instance, a nation-
wide wage floor, which is binding for the less productive regions, may generate aggregate effects after
idiosyncratic shocks: an inequality-increasing shock to productivity may raise both the average unemployment
and the dispersion of unemployment rates across regions.  See Pench, Sestito and Frontini (1999).13
• cyclical downturns are times of unusually intense restructuring in the economy, with
increased flows into and out of unemployment, and aggregate shocks play an initial
(sometimes minor) role;
• idiosyncratic factors (e.g. related to industry, region, wages, employer size and age, capital
and energy intensity) are important in the determination of gross job creation, while
aggregate shocks are the dominant source of fluctuations in destruction flows (as well as in
average employment growth);
• job destructions are strongly counter-cyclical while job creations are moderately pro-
cyclical.
27
The latter result implies that the intensity of job reallocations is counter-cyclical; this
outcome corresponds to Lilien's result of a counter-cyclical dispersion index between (sectoral)
employment growth rates. But a question remains unanswered: is the recession the cause of
intensified reallocations or, viceversa, is the increased dispersion of employment growth rates
the origin of the recessions, and of the consequent rise in unemployment (as claimed by
Lilien)? (Loungani, 1996). From this point of view, my time-series results deserve some further
scrutiny.
Turning now to my cross-section approach (Marelli, 1998), I shift the attention to
some long-run determinants of the employment dynamics
28, and I focus on two structural
indicators at the regional level:
• the first one is the employment rate, i.e. total employment divided by working-age
population, which is a quite significant ratio, because it comprises information concerning
labour supply (labour force participation) and labour demand (unemployment rates);
• the second structural indicator that I have used is an index of specialisation, computed on
the basis of three macro-sectors (agriculture, industry, and the services)
29.
The (SER) index shows a clear fall in the final year (1991), both in Spain and in Italy,
the two countries where many regions exhibited, at the beginning of the period, the highest
values of the index; but the fall in the degree of specialisation (at least according to my level of
disaggregation) is a more general phenomenon, common to all European regions.
The results of cross-section analysis (where GDP growth and the regional dispersion
index are also added) seem to show that employment growth tends to be negatively associated
with initial employment rates; moreover, structural convergence and diversification in
production (i.e. a reduction in the index of specialisation) look as important forces sustaining
employment growth in the European regions.
30
                                               
27 This means “that recessions are a time of ‘cleansing’, when outdated or unprofitable techniques and
products are pruned out of the productive system” (Caballero and Hammour, 1994, p. 1365); this is associated
to the schumpeterian idea of “creative destruction”. Some other theoretical works on the topic include
Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), Caballero, Engel and Haltiwanger (1997).
28 As an example of structural determinants, the recent work by Pianta and Vivarelli (1999) explains the
poor European performance in terms of employment, vs. the US and Japan, on the basis of structural (the
sectoral composition of industry) and technological factors.
29 The index is the following:  SER =  Si ‰si - si
*‰  where si  is the share of sector i out of total regional
employment and si
* is the corresponding share in the reference country, in my case the EU5 average (its
numerical value is between 0 and 2). The same index has been used also by Krugman (1993, p. 250), who has
shown in this way that European nations are less specialised than US regions.
30 The existence of “convergence clubs” among the European regions, based on regional specialisation, has
been found in a recent research by Giannetti (1998). A recent research by OECD (1999) confirms the14
Finally, I present here, in more detail, some further results of a new type of analysis, a
panel data estimation with fixed effects. I have considered (Marelli, 1998), for all 81 regions
of the sample, three time intervals (1977-81, 1982-86, 1987-90), thus obtaining 243
observations; I have used the generalised least squares (GLS), with cross section weights, as
estimation method. The results are presented in Table 2.
In specification [1], employment growth in the European regions (DOR) has been
regressed on total employment growth in the EU (DOEU), obtaining a significant and positive
coefficient. The second explanatory variable (DYR) represents real GDP growth in each single
European region: its coefficient is positive and significant too.
Given that Lilien's dispersion index captures the most relevant episodes of labour
reallocations, originally across sectors
31, here I have applied it, first of all, to interregional
dispersion. In fact, the third explanatory variable (SR) is the dispersion index computed
between the regions belonging to the same country: the estimated coefficient turns out to be
negative and significant. Thus, the cross-regional dispersion seems to have a negative impact
on employment growth (as already found in the time-series analysis): this is the Lilien’s effect.
To explain the meaning, consider the following situation: a supply-side shock hits a certain
economic system but it affects principally some regions within a given country, thus increasing
the cross-regional dispersion (SR); then, according to our results, this is likely to have a
negative effect on average employment growth.
In equation [2], I have added also the variable SXEU, namely the cross-country
dispersion index (its numerical value is the same for all the 81 regions). Its estimated
coefficient turned out to be positive and significant
32, accrediting what I have called the
laggard effect: in this case, the frictions and rigidities are limited to the regions in the lagging
countries and a supply-side shock may hurt primarily some countries, thus increasing the cross-
national dispersion (SXEU), without inducing negative effects on average employment growth.
33
Finally, in equation [3], I have added two new explanatory variables: they are the
structural variables already introduced in the cross-section analysis. Both variables, the change
                                                                                                                                                  
decreasing specialisation of the European regions, especially since the mid-'80s; on the other hand, if we use
output (instead of employment) and if we compute the specialisation index across countries (instead of regions)
an increasing specialisation pattern seems to emerge.
31 See my previous research, devoted to a sectoral disaggregation, presented in Marelli (1999).
32 The different sign of the correlation between SXEU and DOR, in comparison with the previously
commented association between SR and DOR, if we agree with the interpretation of Pench, Sestito and Frontini
(1999), is due to the fact that a common wage floor is present within countries but not between countries.
33 An example of supply-side shocks leading to laggard’s effects is a change in the terms of trade or in real
exchange rates (this was experienced by many European countries in the ‘80s) which leads to a change in the
(relative) competitive position of the different European countries but affects in a similar way all the regions of
the same country; of course, in the case of a fall in competitiveness, the effects are more pronounced in the
(lagging) countries exhibiting the strongest frictions and rigidities. An example of supply-side shocks causing
Lilien’s effects is provided by a shift of demand from more traditional goods towards “new” goods like
electronic production, an industry normally located in specific regions of each single country: if there are
frictions and rigidities in all regions (including restrictions to labour mobility), then a deceleration in
employment growth may be realised even in the more dynamic regions specialised in electronic production, and
so by aggregate employment.15
in the employment rate (DTR) and the change in the specialisation index (DSER), turned out
to be positive and significant.
34
Thus, considering the differentiated impact of rigidities and frictions to labour market
adjustments, including restrictions to labour mobility, it seems that high growth rates in
aggregate employment may correspond  either to an increase or to a reduction in the
employment growth dispersion index, according to whether it is computed across regions or
countries.
To recapitulate, a negative correlation, signalling the presence of Lilien’s effects (by
which aggregate employment growth is adversely affected by labour reallocations), has been
discovered in the EU5 area if we consider the cross-regional dispersion. A positive correlation
between aggregate employment growth and the sigma dispersion index, corresponding to what
I have called the laggard effect (by which the supply-side shocks harm principally the less
developed areas), has been found in the case of the cross-national dispersion. In the latter
case, shocks and disturbances (either symmetric or asymmetric) - also in the forthcoming EMU
– are likely to hurt primarily the lagging countries, or at least the countries most affected by the
rigidities and frictions. In the former case, it is the average employment dynamics as well as the
aggregate European employment growth that are also influenced by such rigidities.
7.  Conclusions
In this research, I have used different data sets and various methods of analysis to
examine the long-run behaviour of employment and unemployment in the regions of the five
biggest countries of the EU. Despite the simplicity (in some cases) of the analytical tools, I
have obtained some firm results, which can be summarised as follows:
1. in Europe we have had high and increasing unemployment rates (the only exception to the
growing trend, in my sample, is the UK since the mid-'80s)
35;
2. also the employment rates have been slowly decreasing (in Italy more than in other
countries, because of the Mezzogiorno's worsening situation);
3. in most countries, a considerable dispersion in regional employment and unemployment
rates has been found;
4. such as dispersion (of a s-type) has been increasing over time almost everywhere;
5. across all European regions of our set, a convergence (of the b-type) of employment has
been found only in certain periods and considering specific set of countries;
6. a substantially high correlation between mean (national) unemployment rates and their
interregional dispersion (s.d.) seems rather robust;
7. cross-region and cross-country dispersion in employment growth may have different
impacts on average employment growth in Europe;
8. regional employment growth is, in any case, highly correlated also with EU's aggregate
employment growth and with GDP growth.
                                               
34 As to the other explanatory variables included in the same equation, aside from a modification in the
numerical values of the estimated coefficients (but not in the signs), we can notice that only the DOEU variable
is no longer significant.
35 If we focus on the last five years and consider also the small European countries, some of them have
shown a decreasing trend in unemployment, such as the Netherlands, Ireland, Portugal, Spain. However, this
more positive trend can be detected also in some group of regions, like Northern Italy. This is an example to
show the importance of a regional disaggregation of the analysis.16
Coming now to the policy implications of my research, the last mentioned result
confirms that some appropriate aggregate demand policies are still important, also with
reference to employment growth.
 36 Of course, a new type of aggregate demand management,
which recognises the role of the European central bank and the other EU institutions, is
needed. In any case, both the EU and the national governments should support aggregate
demand, e.g. through appropriate incentives to private investments or the implementation of
public investments (infrastructure, telecommunications, R & D, education, etc.)
37
However, it is usually recognised that a great part of European unemployment is
structural. Also my analysis shows the importance of structural policies, in order to make
more flexible the labour market, to increase the mobility of workers, to ease labour
reallocations (between sectors, regions and countries). This will lead, according to my
empirical results, to an increase in aggregate employment growth. Moreover, according to the
theories on optimum currency areas (see Section 2), these policies will reduce the real effects
coming from negative shocks. Other relevant structural policies may include the following:
reforms of product markets, innovative industrial and regional policies, provision of advanced
services to firms (especially new firms), measures for human capital formation and retraining,
incentives to hiring new employees
38, etc.
Since the existing economic structures, together with the relevant institutions and
regulations, are still different across the European countries, even in the EMU’s area,
structural policies – undertaken either by the EU institutions or by the national governments –
should be differentiated, by country and region. In fact, the prevailing view in Europe is that
structural policies should not be centralised, but should rather follow the "subsidiarity
principle". This was traditionally the aim of regional policies, but it should become the typical
operational method of other structural policies, such as labour-market policies. Only if this
real convergence of economic structures will be achieved, will the EMU setting and its
nominal convergence conditions  produce optimal economic and social outcomes.
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Table 1 – Countries and regions in the EU5 data set
CODE COUNTRY / REGION CODE COUNTRY / REGION
DE BR DEUTSCHLAND 39 IT33 FRIULI-VENEZIA GIULIA
1 DE1 BADEN-WURTTEMBERG 40 IT4 EMILIA-ROMAGNA
2 DE2 BAYERN 41 IT51 TOSCANA
3 DE5 BREMEN 42 IT152 UMBRIA
4 DE6 HAMBURG 43 IT153 MARCHE
5 DE7 HESSEN 44 IT6 LAZIO
6 DE9 NIEDERSACHSEN 45 IT71 ABRUZZO
7 DEa NORDRHEIN-WESTFALEN 46 IT72 MOLISE
8 DEb RHEINLAND-PFALZ 47 IT8 CAMPANIA
9 DEc SAARLAND 48 IT91 PUGLIA
10 DEf SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN 49 IT92 BASILICATA
FR FRANCE 50 IT93 CALABRIA
11 FR1 ILE DE FRANCE 51 ITa SICILIA
12 FR21 CHAMPAGNE-ARDENNE 52 ITb SARDEGNA
13 FR22 PICARDIE UK UNITED KINGDOM
14 FR23 HAUTE-NORMANDIE 53 UKe YORKSHIRE HUMBERSIDE
15 FR24 CENTRE 54 UKf EAST MIDLANDS
16 FR25 BASSE-NORMANDIE 55 UKg WEST MIDLANDS
17 FR26 BOURGOGNE 56 UKh1 EAST ANGLIA
18 FR3 NORD-PAS-DE-CALAIS 57 UKk SOUTH WEST
19 FR41 LORRAINE 58 UKm1 WALES
20 FR42 ALSACE 59 UKm4 SCOTLAND
21 FR43 FRANCHE-COMTE 60 NORTHERN IRELAND
22 FR51 PAYS DE LA LOIRE ES ESPANA
23 FR52 BRETAGNE 61 ES11 GALICIA
24 FR53 POITOU-CHARENTES 62 ES12 ASTURIAS
25 FR61 AQUITAINE 63 ES13 CANTABRIA
26 FR62 MIDI-PYRENEES 64 ES21 PAIS VASCO
27 FR63 LIMOUSIN 65 ES22 NAVARRA
28 FR71 RHONE-ALPES 66 ES23 RIOJA
29 FR72 AUVERGNE 67 ES24 ARAGON
30 FR81 LANGUEDOC-ROUSSILLON 68 ES3 MADRID
31 FR82 PROVENCE-ALPES-COTES D’AZ. 69 ES41 CASTILLA-LEON
32 FR83 CORSE 70 ES42 CASTILLA-LA MANCHA
IT ITALIA 71 ES43 EXTREMADURA
33 IT11 PIEMONTE 72 ES51 CATALUNA
34 IT12 VALLE D'AOSTA 73 ES52 COMUNIDAD VALENCIANA
35 IT13 LIGURIA 74 ES53 BALEARES
36 IT2 LOMBARDIA 75 ES61 ANDALUCIA
37 IT31 TRENTINO-ALTO ADIGE 76 ES62 MURCIA
38 IT32 VENETO 77 ES63 CEUTA Y MELILLA20
78 ES7 CANARIAS
Table 2 - Regressions of employment growth – Pooled data
[1] [2] [3]
DOEU 0.520   (11.48) 0.442   (9.13)
DYR 0.551   (18.50) 0.601   (20.77) 0.111   (10.85)
SR -228.5  (7.99) -198.7  (7.87) -37.97  (2.97)
SXEU 974.8    (2.99) 1044.4  (13.9)
DTR 2.252    (111.0)
DSER 0.052    (3.72)
n. obs. 243 243 243
Adj. R2 0.958 0.976 0.996
F-stat. 2838.16 3377.4 16158.7
Pooled data estimation: 81 regions and 3 time periods (1977-81, 1982-86, 1987-
90). Dependent variable: DOR (logarithmic difference of regional employment).
Explanatory variables: DOEU (logarithmic difference of EU5 employment), DYR
(logarithmic difference of regional real GDP), SR (dispersion index computed
between the regions of each single country), SXEU (dispersion index computed
between the 5 countries); DTR (change in the employment rate in the region),
DSER (change in the specialisation index vs. EU5); t-statistics in parentheses.
Source: Marelli (1998)2122





































































































































































































































































Fig. 1.D - EMPLOYMENT RATES: UNITED 
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Fig. 2.C - EMPLOYMENT GROWTH: ITALY
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Fig. 2.D - EMPLOYMENT GROWTH: UNITED 
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Fig. 4 - EMPLOYMENT IN EU5 REGIONS:
(A) Growth 1986-97 vs. Growth 1979-86
(B)  Empl. Rates 1997 vs. Empl. Rates 1979






Fig. 5 - EMPLOYMENT GROWTH IN THE EU5 REGIONS
(A) Growth 1979-97 vs. Empl. Rates 1979
(B) Growth 1979-97 vs. GDP ppp 1980
(C) Growth 1979-86 vs. Empl. Rates 1979
(D) Growth 1979-86 vs. GDP ppp 1980
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Fig. 6 - EMPLOYMENT GROWTH IN THE EU5 REGIONS
 (A) Growth 1986-97 vs. Empl. Rates 1986
           (B) Growth 1986-97 vs. Empl. Rates 1986 (no Spain)
 (C) Growth 1986-97 vs. GDP ppp 1986
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